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Summary: A contribution appeared in the previous issue of Panoeconomicus reviewed 
the theoretical arguments brought by Alain Parguez and Jean Gabriel Bliek in support of 
their idea of assigning a full employment objective to European economic policies and 
their coordination (Bliek and Parguez (2007) and Parguez (2007b)). Without pretending 
at exhaustiveness, this contribution reviews and partly extends the empirical evidence 
they presented in support of their argument with reference to selected macroeconomic 
developments in several countries and different historical periods, in particular for the 
US, Canada, Japan and the EU. It confirms the descriptive power of the circuit and its 
relevance for the discussion of alternative economic policies, in particular in the field of 
employment. Together with the previous article, it shows that the circuit can be used to 
update economic policy thinking, nourishing also the necessary democratic debate 
amongst policy alternatives. 
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Introduction and background 
 
A previous contribution showed that using the theoretical approach of the mone-
tary circuit as typical of “out of equilibrium” economic theories it is possible to 
discuss and propose active economic policy measures in the pursuit of objectives 
of social interest, such as full employment. It is thus natural to look for confir-
mations of the empirical validity of this approach. Two obvious tests for the the-
ory of the circuit concern the pricing behaviour and the causality between in-
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vestment and savings, which have been discussed in the previous contribution. 
The test on prices can be carried out with reference to a variant of the mark-up 
identity, which describes the pricing behaviour of the main social groups in-
volved in the process of money creation and destruction: Government, banks, 
firms, households and the foreign sector. Investment-savings relationships can 
be tested through Kalecki’s identity and the hierarchy it introduces between the 
same social groups, in a context where investment drives savings. Some general 
empirical evidence concerning these two identities is examined below in sec-
tions 2 and 3. The same identities are also used by Bliek and Parguez (2007) as a 
tool for interpreting a wide range of economic facts of the recent evolution of the 
US, Canada, Japan and the EU. Their arguments are discussed and partly ex-
tended in sections 4 to 8 below.  
 
 
1.  Empirical support for the mark-up identity 
 
Like post-Keynesian and Sraffian approaches, the circuit analysis of inflation 
integrates mark-up pricing based on the “full-cost principle” (Graziani, 2003 
p. 100-105). This type of pricing behaviour has been subject to extensive studies 
and econometric testing starting from the seminal work of Hall and Hitch (1939) 
and Kahn (1952), further developed in the post-Keynesian literature by Wein-
traub (1959 and 1979), Eichner (1973) and Sylos Labini (1961, 1967, 1979, 
1991), who used it to test its Sraffian approach to oligopoly theory. It was also 
applied in a spirit closer to the neo-classical synthesis in the celebrated paper of 
Eckstein and Fromm (1968). Explicit or implicit variants of mark—up pricing 
also form the basis for the specification of the inflation-wage dynamics of most 
large macro-econometric models (see for instance Artus, Deleau, and Malgrange 
(1986, pp. 91-95)).  
To fix ideas, it is useful to remind the version of mark-up equation used 
by Parguez (2007b), which is: 
p =
w
α
(1+ r*)(1+ λ)+ σ  
where: 
p   are average domestic production prices  
w  is the average wage 
α   is the average productivity of labour  
w/α  are unit labour costs 
r*   is the target rate of corporate profits 
λ  is a measure of interest costs and/or banks’ margins  
σ  is the unit cost of “producer disequilibrium”, i.e. the unit cost increase 
associated with a less than full use of capacity utilisation, which can be 
seen as a measure of the distance from minimum long-run average costs. Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy II. Review of Some Empirical aspects 
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With reference to the Canadian economy, Seccareccia (1984) tested sev-
eral “circuit” variants of the mark-up equation for the period 1957-81, including 
a possible role for investment in the determination of prices. He took as depend-
ent variable the change in the consumer price index and tested the role of in-
vestment through explanatory variables such as the ratio between employment in 
investment and consumption goods industries, in a “neo-wicksellian” framework 
that inspired also the theoretical contribution of Parguez (1991). Other explana-
tory variables included the usual indicators of unit costs, in particular unit labour 
costs. Seccareccia concluded (pp. 208-9) that “inflation comes to reflect the cy-
clical divergences between the flows of investment and savings”, which “… in a 
monetary production economy … are themselves financed primarily by an en-
dogenous flow of savings”.  
Besides confirming indirectly the circuit, his results also question the 
stability of the mark-up over time, generally assumed as given in earlier studies. 
Another empirical complication stems from the divergence between the sign to 
be expected for the variable of capacity utilisation, sometimes retained as an in-
dicator of “demand pressure”, and having thus an expected positive sign on in-
flation, and sometimes retained as a supply disequilibrium cost, which implies a 
negative relation to prices. However, these specific and rather technical points 
do not undermine the general result that cost-plus pricing behaviour is generally 
acknowledged to prevail for all sectors of the economy, with the exception of 
agriculture and raw materials. In these two sectors prices are believed to be 
mainly influenced by the traditional forces of demand and supply, but specula-
tive movements, that can also bring them far out from the walrasian equilibrium, 
are poorly understood.  
In conclusion, despite debates remain open on some technical questions, 
it can be retained that in general prices diverge form unit costs in modern indus-
trial economies, i.e. non-walrasian pricing prevails. Together with the dynamics 
of capital accumulation, this is the main reason why the studies on the long-run 
properties of large macro-econometric models conclude that the long-term is 
non-walrasian.
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  These studies look at the internal dynamics of models taken as representative of actual econo-
mies, at least at the level of the interrelationships existing between observable variables: “… It is 
clear that the long run of macroeconometric models is not walrasian: it would be advantageous for 
firms to produce more and for consumers to work more at equilibrium prices; this is blocked by 
the monopolistic behavior of the agents”. Deleau, Le Van and Malgrange (1991). Massimo Cingolani 
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2.  Some empirical tests of Kalecki’s identity 
 
Concerning the causality between investment and savings, direct econometric 
testing started later than that on the price mark-up and presents more difficulties 
as savings and investment are measured together statistically.
2  
It is reminded that Kalecki’s identity can be written: 
  
  Se − Ie
Entreprises
profits
1  2  3 + Sf − I f
BoP   current
account   surplus
1  2  3 
=
← Ig − Sg
Government
deficit
1  2  3 
+ Ih − Sh
Households 
financing   need
1  2  3  −   Sb − Ib
Banks  profits
1  2  3   
where S represents saving and I investment. The logic of the circuit implies that 
investment has a causal effect on savings and there is a hierarchy between the 
institutional sectors, by which Government, households and banks decisions in-
teract in determining profits, with an indeterminate role for the external sector 
that could either be causal or caused, depending on the exchange rate regime and 
the size of country.  
Given the difficulties, the causality between investment and savings is 
sometimes tested indirectly, either in cross-sections of countries and regions, 
where it is examined jointly with the hypothesis of international capital or re-
gional mobility, or by testing its implications such as the hypothesis of twin 
deficits or that of the crowding out. Eisner (1995) showed for instance that for 
the US higher budget deficits generate higher private domestic savings inde-
pendently from the foreign constraint
3. Llorca (2005) concluded that the neo-
classical case for the crowding out can hold only in two cases: when there is a 
strong elasticity of private investment to the interest rate or when there is full 
employment. The empirical evidence does not support strongly any of them. 
Developed as a test of the hypothesis of the international mobility of 
capital, the huge literature on the “Feldstein-Horioka puzzle” can also be inter-
preted as an indirect validation of the Kaleckian reading of the investment-
saving identity. Since in general savings appear to be well correlated with in-
vestment in cross-country regressions, this could simply mean that it is indeed 
determined by investment. For instance, Blecker (1995) concludes his review of 
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle by arguing that his analysis “undermines the case 
for generalized pro-saving policies as a panacea for accelerating economic 
growth. Particularly, efforts to reduce budget deficits or to increase personal 
saving rate would seem to have small or negligible effects on business invest-
ment” (p. 223). This empirical result is obtained with reference to a theoretical 
                                                 
2 See for instance Moore (2006). Ch. 7 (pp. 156-173) is indeed entitled “Saving is the accounting 
record of investment”. 
3 In particular Chap. 5, “Sense and non sense about the budget deficit”, pp. 89-119. Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy II. Review of Some Empirical aspects 
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model that remains half way through between mainstream approaches and 
post-Keynesian ones, as it gives no role to effective demand in the long-term. On 
this point Marglin (1995) commented that: “The New-Keynesians, like the neo-
classical synthetizers before them, gave up the real fight when they conceded the 
long-run to the other side, reducing Keynes to a search for reasons why the 
classical – be it Neo or New- verities do not hold all the time, in the short period 
as well as in the long. … as long as we concede the long run we are out of the 
game – both the theoretical game and the policy game” (Marglin 1995, p. 232).  
For the US, Marglin (1984, Ch. 18) had himself attempted to test 
Neo-classical, Marxist and Keynesian theories of savings in a book which de-
velops a framework for the application of the three main economic growth theo-
ries to the long-run and for their empirical validation. His conclusion was that 
the neo-classical saving function based on the life-cycle hypothesis explained at 
best the behaviour of the 1-2% of the US population at the top of the income 
distribution. This group accounted for a large portion of total household savings, 
but over the period 1959-1979, household savings represented hardly one quarter 
of total American productive private savings. Household’s savings accounted for 
2.5% of disposable income, against 3.8% for corporates and 2.7% for pension 
funds, therefore the life-cycle hypothesis explained at best one third of total sav-
ings. Marglin concluded: “Our ignorance is presumably remediable, but not un-
til we free ourselves from the straitjacket of neoclassical theory, which concen-
trates our attention on the less important, if not the trivial, while failing abso-
lutely to come to grips with essence of the problem” (p. 433). 
Gordon (1997) provided a systematic empirical test of the causality of 
investment on savings, concluding that: “it is reasonable to argue, in short, that 
neoclassical policy analysts are wrong on two counts. First, promoting saving 
by itself is not especially likely to stimulate investment. Second, public policies 
promoting productivity growth, with the corollary of objective of stimulating 
investment, can potentially have substantial effect and should be pursued much 
more aggressively”. 
Seccareccia (1994) tested econometrically the following variant of Kal-
ecki’s identity for the period 1962-88 in Canada:   
π = I − Sh
b () + D− Sh
g ( )+ Xn = ΔM  
where:  π  =  Business savings or retained earnings 
   I  =  Flow  of  investment 
   Sh
b  =  Portion of households savings that went towards the  
purchase of corporate bonds and securities 
D = Government  deficit 
   Sh
g  =  Portion of households savings that went towards the  
purchase of Government bonds Massimo Cingolani 
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   X n   = Net exports 
   ΔM = Amount of endogenous money creation that took place 
during the period in the form of “outside money” created 
by the central bank to “accommodate” Government’s  
borrowing requirement. 
 
Seccareccia run regressions for both ￿M1 and ￿ as dependent variables, 
taking as explanatory variables the difference between gross fixed capital forma-
tion and personal savings, the difference between the Government deficit and 
household’s acquisition of Government bonds, equal to the purchase of Gov-
ernment securities by the central bank, and net exports. He obtained three statis-
tically significant positive signs, explaining two thirds of the variance of the de-
pendent variable for M1 and 90% for profits. The results imply a non-rejection of 
Kalecki’s causality hypothesis. They confirm that household’s savings, whether 
directed towards the corporate or the Government sector, have a negative impact 
on profits. Current and lagged values of household’s savings and government 
deficits were also regressed against each other, showing that past household’s 
savings determine current government deficit, but not the contrary. 
Lavoie and Seccareccia (2004) tested several investment functions for 
the Canadian manufacturing and industrial sectors for the period 1960-2000 try-
ing to discriminate between the Marxian and Keynesian approaches. They ar-
gued that, whereas in the short-run both theories accept the role of effective de-
mand in determining output, the discriminating factor is the long-run, for which 
Marxists tend to agree with the neo-classicals on the role of scarcity and there-
fore see demand as determined by supply. In both approaches it is meaningful to 
estimate an investment function independently from savings, where the depend-
ent variable is the change in the rate of accumulation of capital. This variable is 
regressed against indicators relating to capacity utilisation, income distribution 
and activity.  
Lavoie and Seccareccia run several tests on the specifications selected 
for the 4 variants of the two theories they tested, including some encompassing 
tests and concluded in favour of the “sophisticated Kaleckian version” as the 
best specification.  
 
 
3.  Testing the twin deficit hypothesis for the US 
 
Parguez and Bliek (2007) argue that in the US, when the Clinton administration 
opted for a policy of Government surpluses in the 1990s, the reduction in profits 
caused by increased Government savings was more than compensated by in-
creased private sector debt. Banks endorsed enterprises and households plans for 
higher revenues and financed the increase in household debt that supported the Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy II. Review of Some Empirical aspects 
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long expansion cycle that followed. For an economy that is sufficiently large to 
float its exchange rate, this built up of private debt explains also the digging of 
the current account deficit of the balance of payments. It contrasts with the twin 
deficits explanation of the current account, often used to justify zero-inflation 
policies and according to which the deficit in payments with non-American resi-
dents derives from the State budget imbalance. The twin deficits are a straight-
forward consequence of the neoclassical explanation of investment by savings. 
The latter does not fit the data for this period because the US current account 
deficit deteriorated when the budget deficit started to move into a surplus.  
Chart 1: US "twin" deficits
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Households’ confidence, supported by banks, explains why enterprises kept an 
optimistic view on the economic prospects and therefore maintained employ-
ment close to full capacity by increasing their debt. 
 
 
4.  Testing the twin deficits for Canada 
 
A similar development occurred in Canada during the eighties when; as noted by 
Seccareccia (1994), the budget deficit and the current account had an almost per-
fect negative correlation until 1994. Starting from the second half of the nineties, 
the reduction in public debt was largely compensated by the increase in house-
holds’ debt, while the current account of the balance of payments moved into a 
surplus, driven by the US current account deficit (see chart 2 below). Massimo Cingolani 
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Chart 2: Canada "twin" deficits and US current account balance
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As noted by Seccareccia (2008) the massive public debt decrease that occurred 
in Canada between 1995 and 2005, from 70% of GDP to 30% of GDP, had its 
counterpart in a built-up of household’s debt of the order of 10% of GDP, with 
an almost perfect negative correlation between Government and households’ net 
lending in % of GDP. This development rendered the Canadian financial sector 
more fragile to the current turbulent financial phase. 
 
 
5.  Crowding-out in Japan 
 
The case of Japan is peculiar: it clearly cannot be explained with the traditional 
crowding-out theory, according to which high State deficits and debt put an up-
ward pressure on interest rates, since the highest level of public debt in the in-
dustrial world coexists with the lowest level of long-term interest rates (see chart 
3). Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy II. Review of Some Empirical aspects 
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Chart 3: Debt and long-term interest: spurious negative correlation ?
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6.  The situation in Europe 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe Bliek and Parguez see “passive Government defi-
cits” coexisting with growing current account deficits financed by capital in-
flows and growing household’s indebtedness.  
In the “Euro-core” the focus is put on the reduction of the budget deficit, 
which drives fiscal coordination, and the restrictive orientation of monetary pol-
icy, devised to fight inflation and to keep unemployment close to its “natural 
rate” or its “non-accelerating of inflation” rate (NAIRU). Fiscal stability targets 
force “beggar my neighbour” competitive disinflation policies (cf.  Fitoussi and 
Le Cacheux (2007), ch. 4 and 5) nourishing bleak economic prospects for sala-
ries and profits. These constrain enterprises and households expectations, result-
ing in the end in higher unemployment.  
The European unemployment situation is best exemplified by the case of 
France, which has experienced high and growing rates of unemployment and 
underemployment in the last thirty years. The underemployment rate is a meas-
ure of the portion of the labour force that is “labour rationed”, i.e. that cannot 
fulfil its consumption targets because it cannot find a suitable job. It includes the 
officially unemployed, those that earn the minimum wage (“RMIstes”), those in 
early retirement, those following under special retraining programmes and gen-
erally all those suffering from exclusion in the labour market. Two striking facts 
characterise the evolution of the French rate of underemployment in the last Massimo Cingolani 
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thirty years: its profile has diverged from that of the unemployment rate (con-
trary to the US where the two variables have moved together) and it has almost 
continuously increased, to reach more than a third of the labour force. 
The traditional explanation for this divergence in the development of 
unemployment and underemployment in Europe and in the US is based on 
greater “labour market rigidities” prevailing in Europe. This interpretation re-
sults in part from a straightforward application of the IS-LM reading of the Gen-
eral Theory, which, as it attempts to bring back the Keynesian contribution un-
der the Walrasian paradigm, explains unemployment by downward wage rate 
rigidity. Whereas IS-LM, which was in the end rejected by Hicks himself (Hicks 
(1980)), is an acceptable reduced form for other policy purposes, it does not al-
low for endogenous involuntary unemployment, which was the problem ad-
dressed by Keynes.  
On the contrary, based on Kalecki’s identity and on the mark-up equa-
tion, the difference in the US and EU underemployment performance appears as 
being caused by the different use of macroeconomic policy instruments in the 
two areas: in Europe the need to target continuously a reduction in the budget 
deficit and control inflation exerts, other things equal, a downward pressure on 
corporate profits, which in turn reduces effective demand and lowers the level of 
employment, generating the need for a further cut of the deficit at the next stage 
of the circuit. This generates a dynamic of lower economic growth and higher 
unemployment. In the US macroeconomic policy instruments are actively used 
to govern the business cycle. 
This interpretation of the European situation is consistent with the re-
sults of Stockhammer (2004, Ch. 4 pp. 113), who tested the NAIRU explanation 
of unemployment against the post-Keynesian one for the four main European 
countries (DE, FR, IT and UK) and for the US for the period from 1960 to mid-
1990
4. The NAIRU hypothesis was tested by a regression where the dependent 
variable was the unemployment rate and the explanatory variables were measur-
ing labour market inflexibility and wage pushed inflation. The Keynesian alter-
native was tested by a regression where the dependent variable was the growth 
of private sector employment and the explanatory variables were the rate of ac-
cumulation, measured by the rate of growth of the business sector capital stock, 
                                                 
4 On a more microeconomic level one can make reference to the numerous studies of Leroy on the 
Belgian labour market, cf. for instance Leroy (1981a, 1981b, 1983) and Leroy, Godano and Sonnet 
(198-). The latter examined Belgian geographical labour markets at the NUTS3 level (about 40 
arondissements) between 1979 and 1981, when the national unemployment rate rose from 3% to 
13%. It notably showed that, despite flexibility exists at regional level, the role of wages in ex-
plaining inter-regional labour market adjustments is weak. The authors pointed instead to the im-
portance of quantity adjustments, including movements in and out of the labour force, illustrating 
mechanisms modeled by the rationing literature, but also confirming indirectly the post-Keynesian 
point that there is in general no inverse relation between labour quantities and wages (cf. par. 3.2 
of the previous contribution). Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy II. Review of Some Empirical aspects 
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a capacity variable, for which the capital productivity was used as an instrumen-
tal measure. Stockhammer concluded that the wage-push variables (unemploy-
ment benefits, union density and the tax wedge) did not have the expected effect 
on unemployment, except for the tax-wedge. On the contrary, the Keynesian role 
of accumulation on employment growth was confirmed. He therefore concluded 
that: “the focus on labour market institutions in combating European unem-
ployment is inappropriate. For example we found no evidence that reducing un-
employment benefits reduces unemployment. Demand variables, that according 
to the Keynesian theory are key even in the long run, on the other hand, should 
be taken more seriously. Our evidence indicates that the slowdown in accumula-
tion is at least partially responsible for the insufficient creation of new jobs.” 
Stockhammer also investigated the causes of the reduced rate of capital accumu-
lation on the basis of an investment equation of the type of those of Lavoie and 
Seccareccia (2004), where the explanatory variables were capacity accumula-
tion, the profit share, the cost of capital and rentier’s share of non-financial busi-
ness. He concluded that “financialisation” and “share-holders’ value orienta-
tion”, measured notably by rentier’s share of non-financial business, explained 
the slowdown in accumulation. Accordingly, he proposed to change the orienta-
tion of European policy actions, notably in the direction of committing European 
countries to full employment and growth.  
Indeed if one compares the long-term evolution of the main EU conti-
nental economies to those of the UK, Japan and the US in the last decades, it is 
striking to observe that in continental Europe the long-term interest rate has al-
most continuously exceeded the rate of nominal growth of Gross Domestic 
Product (see charts 4 in the Annex). The mark-up equation helps understanding 
why the contractionary policy mix prevailing in Europe generates a positive gap 
between the long-term nominal interest rate and the rate of increase of nominal 
GDP
5. Parguez and Bliek reminded that it is Domar (1944) who demonstrated, 
many years ago, that this gap is the key variable for the control of the debt/GDP 
ratio. Sylos-Labini (2003) discussed the role of this variable with reference to 
the financial situation of the American households, whereas Pasinetti (1997 and 
2003) examined its implications for the Maastricht stability parameters. 
It can be inferred from the analysis above that if full employment would 
become a common target of European fiscal coordination, then the gap between 
the rate of GDP growth and long-term interest rates would disappear or change 
                                                 
5 If it is natural to think that the real rate of interest is equal to the real rate of annual GDP growth 
(see for instance Sylos Labini (1948) or Phelps (1966)), it seems also licit to derive from the ar-
guments of Parguez (2007a) and Graziani (1983, 1984 and 2003, ch. 7) that the nominal gap be-
tween the two variables results mechanically when the nominal rate of interest is indexed to ex-
pected inflation (so-called Fisher rule). This interpretation seems compatible with the circuit 
analysis of the spread between short and long run interest rates made by Seccareccia (2005). Massimo Cingolani 
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sign also in the Euro-core area, as it is already the case in the New Member 
States (see Annex), and this could happen without accelerating inflation.  
 
What else could be done to promote a policy of full-employment in 
Europe? Parguez and Bliek propose to accept that the European budget could go 
into a deficit, notably to finance a European scheme of Social Security. On capi-
tal formation they endorse a policy of support for infrastructure and they agree 
that sound investment could be taken out from the Maastricht ceilings, a rather 
straightforward extension of the financial leverage principle of corporate finance 
(see for instance Paganelli (1986) pp. 44-47)). Concerning the composition of 
capital expenditures, Parguez and Bliek indicate that beyond infrastructure, edu-
cation and health, housing should also be supported, as well as research and de-
velopment. They thus broadly agree with the main expenditure targets of the 
Lisbon agenda, but point to the need of providing the budgetary means needed to 
realise them.  
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
As shown in the previous contribution, the analysis of the circuit provides a sim-
ple but solid framework describing what happens out of neo-classical equilib-
rium, the only situation where active economic policy is really needed. It also 
illustrates much better the role of money and of the banking sector.  
The above contribution shows that this analysis is consistent with a large 
body of empirical evidence and allows for meaningful policy analyses. In par-
ticular, it supports the claim for a more social orientation of European economic 
policies, calling for the inclusion of full employment amongst their objectives 
and showing that this does not contradict the pursuit of inflation control.  
Although the circuit must probably be further developed before becom-
ing a fully accepted synthesis of “out of equilibrium” approaches, its use for the 
analysis of alternative forms of active policy interventions brings interesting re-
sults, which call already now for a reorientation of European policies. 
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Annex – Charts 4  
 
Nominal GDP growth and annual long-term interest rates in selected coun-
tries. 
Source: Eurostat (for EU countries to all extent possible the long-term interest 
rate retained for Maastricht convergence purposes is retained). 
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